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JUSTICE RUTLEDGE'S APPENDIX
JoHN T. VALAURI*
If "all men are by nature equally free and independent," all
men are to be considered as entering into Society on equal
conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining
no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all
they are to be considered as retaining an "equal title to the
free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of
Conscience."
This Article seeks to clarify the much disputed meaning of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by going back to the
basics of Establishment Clause doctrine: the relationship between
establishment,2 equality, the seminal case Everson v. Board of
Education,3 and the administrative state. The modem Establishment
Clause era began with the Everson decision by the Supreme Court in
1947.4 This case wrestled with issues of equality, evenhandedness,
and separation between church and state, providing the model, for
better or worse, for subsequent church/state litigation. Everson was
also influential in setting the historical tone of much Establishment
Clause discourse. It focused discourse on James Madison's role in the
religious freedom arguments in Virginia during the 1780s-the years
* Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky
University.
1. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments 1 4 (1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 82, 82
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Articles 1
and 16, respectively, of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)).
2. 1 use "establishment" in its broad, modern sense as meaning government aid
to, preference for, and endorsement of religion.
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. See infra notes 5-7. But see infra note 13.
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preceding the drafting of the United States Constitution.5 This focus
was in part because Justice Rutledge appended Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (hereinafter
Remonstrance) to his Everson dissent,6 making the Remonstrance the
central historical document in the subsequent debate on the meaning
of the Establishment Clause.
Almost as common in the literature as affirmations of the
importance of history to Establishment Clause doctrine are complaints
that the history has too often been misinterpreted and misapplied, and
that the Court has made a conflicted mess of the doctrine. 9 Altogether,
5. Justice Rutledge, though a dissenter in the case, did much to frame the terms
of the debate, not just in this case, but in the entire debate that ensued. On the
importance of history in determining the meaning of the clause, he says:
No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content
by its generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment.
It is at once the refined product and the terse summation of that history.
The history includes not only Madison's authorship and the proceedings
before the First Congress, but also the long and intensive struggle for
religious freedom in America, more especially in Virginia, of which the
Amendment was the direct culmination.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 33-34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 63-72. Hence, the title of this Article.
7. As one commentator put it, "Since the Supreme Court's decision in Everson
v. Board of Education, contemporary courts have looked to the Memorial as a
guiding light in resolving issues of religious liberty." Rodney K. Smith, Getting Off
on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reexamination of the History of the
Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the
Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 589 (1984)
(citation omitted).
8. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken
understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause
has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading [wall of separation between
church and state] metaphor for nearly 40 years.").
9. Perhaps the most emphatic statement of this kind comes from Leonard
Levy, who says, "[T]he Court has managed to unite those who stand at polar
opposites on the results that the Court reaches; a strict separationist and a zealous
accommodationist are likely to agree that the Supreme Court would not recognize an
establishment of religion if it took life and bit the justices." LEONARD LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 221-22 (2d ed.
1994). As if to demonstrate the truth of Levy's assertion, Michael McConnell
quotes the statement and then adds, "I stand at a pole opposite to Levy on most of
these issues, but I agree with that assessment." Michael W. McConnell, Religious
92 [Vol. 47
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too much writing in the area has a harshly negative and polemical tone
and purpose. Much heat, but little light, has come from this venting.
This Article has a different, more conciliatory aim. That aim is to
both explain how the history of Establishment Clause doctrine has led
jurists to focus on negativity and argue how both the constitutional
historical narrative and doctrine can be made better. Blame for this
negativity belongs not to Madison, the Everson judges, or later
participants in the debate. The difficulties they labored under arose
mainly from changes in historical circumstances and in the nature and
scope of the American government since the 1780s. Under the
conditions of that era, Madison and others strongly believed that
foundational natural rights of citizens, especially free exercise rights,
compelled government to take a separationist, no aid posture toward
religion.' 0 This was to be done, they thought, for the benefit of both
religion and government 1 and also for the preservation of free
exercise rights for all.
However, the rise of the administrative state, with its extensive
public welfare and public benefit programs, has changed the equation.
Under the contemporary circumstances of the administrative state,
governmental application of a separationist, no aid posture toward
religion leads to discrimination against religion and religious
individuals rather than to equal rights. This has created a
constitutional dilemma because government cannot now follow, as it
could in the 1780s, both the ends of equality and the separation of
church and state. Most of the judicial doctrinal contortions since
Everson have been caused by this fact and by the struggle of the Court
and commentators to deal with it by choosing one horn of the resultant
dilemma or the other, or by attempting somehow to have it both ways.
None of these options have proven workable or justifiable.
The role played by history in this process, unfortunately, has been
more to provide ammunition for polemical disputes rather than to light
the path to resolution of the conflict. This Article suggests a different
approach to history that will allow history to play a different role in
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 115 (1992).
10. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 1, 1.
11. Madison gives as a reason against establishment of religion, "Because
experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the
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Establishment Clause debate. History should be used to explain how
the modem Establishment Clause dilemma might be resolved. Under
this approach, not all history is equally important or relevant to current
cases. But, unlike law office (i.e., one-sided, partisan) history, which
values history based upon what side in the dispute it favors and which
led to the current impasse, this approach introduces a distinction
between underlying principles or rights (e.g., natural and equal rights
and liberties) on the one hand and applications of those principles
(e.g., separation of church and state in the framers' era) on the other
hand. This view opposes approaches on both sides of the
Establishment Clause debate that mechanically plug-in the framers'
injunctions from the 1780s into contemporary situations. 12 Changed
conditions between that time and our own may well call for different
applications of the same principles and for the identification of the
underlying principle and application of the underlying principle
behind the Establishment Clause in a necessarily limited historical
context.
In the remainder of this Article, I will flesh out my admittedly
abstract thesis concerning Establishment Clause interpretation and
doctrine by going back to its origins in two senses-in the framing
debates of the 1780s and in the treatment of those debates in Everson,
the founding case of modem Establishment Clause doctrine. I will
look at the role of Madison's Remonstrance in the spirited debate
among the Justices in the Everson case (itself a 5-4 decision by the
Court). The Justices in Everson, despite their differences, largely
agree on the importance of the founding history in general, and the
importance of Madison and the Remonstrance in particular, in
determining the meaning of the Establishment Clause. I will argue that
equality of natural right, especially free exercise of religion, as argued
12. I agree, for example, with Justice Stewart's statement about the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses that, "It is, I think, a fallacious
oversimplification to regard these two provisions as establishing a single
constitutional standard of 'separation of church and state,' which can be
mechanically applied in every case to delineate the required boundaries between
government and religion." Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
308-09 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's sentiment is shared by
Justice Brennan who otherwise held opposite views concerning religion and
Establishment. Justice Brennan said in that same case, "A too literal quest for the
advice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems to me futile and
misdirected for several reasons . . . ." Id. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring).
94 [Vol. 47
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by Madison in the Remonstrance, justifies the result the Court reached
in that case, although this is not the rationale that Justice Black,
writing for the Court, in fact gives. The separationist doctrine that
both sides argue for presents a stunted and wooden understanding of
the Establishment Clause-an understanding which, when followed,
leads to the violation of the very principles of equal religious liberty
Madison strove to protect.
MADISON, EVERSON AND THE REMONSTRANCE
Everson began the modem Establishment Clause era. It also set
the tone for subsequent Establishment Clause litigation by making the
framing history of the clause the leading issue in Establishment Clause
argument. It put Madison and the Remonstrance at the center of that
argument, leading to the doctrinal conflict and standoff that has
ensued. Some later critics have challenged this choice and the quality
of the Court's historical analysis. Critics have even presented
alternative Establishment Clause histories.' 3 Without entering into this
debate, this Article assumes that it is too late in the day to hit the reset
button in Establishment Clause doctrine and argument, which, for
better or worse, has been established in the frame that the Everson
Court gave it. Constitutional interpretation, like other precedent, is
constrained-path dependent. What has gone before necessarily
affects-even when it does not fully determine-what can be decided
now and how it can be justified. I therefore remain within the terms of
the debate given by Everson and attempt to describe, analyze, and
clarify the doctrinal conflict that has arisen out of that decision.
In this part of the Article, I will examine Justice Black's use of
13. Carl Esbeck, for example, begins a recent comprehensive analysis of the
use of text and history in Establishment Clause argument by saying:
The text and original meaning of the Establishment Clause as drafted by
the First Federal Congress was diminished in its importance when the
United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Everson v.
Board of Education of the Township of Ewing in 1947. Instead of looking
to the record of the debates and minutes of the First Congress, the Everson
Court adopted the principles animating the disestablishment struggle in
Virginia. . . to give substantive content to the Establishment Clause.
Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment
Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1663829 (citations omitted).
952010]
5
Valauri: Justice Rutledge's Appendix
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Madison's arguments writing for the majority in Everson, especially
those in the Remonstrance, and Justices Jackson and Rutledge's use of
Madison's arguments writing in dissent. My aim here is to identify the
underlying causes of doctrinal conflict in order to determine how this
conflict can be rectified. With all the discussion of Everson and the
Remonstrance in Establishment Clause literature, it is surprising how
little attention has been paid to this issue. This is unfortunate, since
such attention will be repaid in doctrinal and analytic illumination.
The facts of the Everson case can be stated briefly.14 A New
Jersey statute allowed school districts to make regulations and enter
into contracts relating to the transportation of students to school.15
Pursuant to this statute, one local board of education permitted
reimbursement of the cost of bus transportation to parents of public
school and parochial school students.1 6 The case resulted from a
taxpayer challenge to that plan.' 7 The federal constitutional provisions
cited were the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Establishment Clause.' 8 This Article focuses only on the
Establishment Clause aspects of the case.
After disposing of the due process objection to the reimbursement
plan, Justice Black turned to the Establishment Clause issue. 19 Justice
Black began his discussion of the Establishment Clause with an
immigration narrative emphasizing the religious persecution that
motivated many to come to America and how, ironically, in the 1780s,
these people suffered from the same religious persecution they sought
to escape.20 Eventually, Justice Black tells us, Americans came to
14. For the Court's rendition of the facts of the case, see Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1947).
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. Transportation to for-profit private schools was not included in the
Board of Education's reimbursement plan, but this was part of neither the taxpayer's
constitutional challenge nor the Court's decision in the case. See id. at 4-5 & n.2.
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 8. Justice Black introduces the topic, saying, "A large proportion of
the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of
laws which compelled them to support and attend government favored churches."
Id. A paragraph later he adds, "These practices of the old world were transplanted
to and began to thrive in the soil of the new America." Id. at 9.
20. Id. at 9.
96 [Vol. 47
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oppose establishments of religion, concluding that "[i]t was these
feelings which found expression in the First Amendment." 21 Justice
Black finds the religious liberty struggle in Virginia in the 1780s, and
especially the work of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, as the
culmination of this effort.22 Justice Black therefore concludes that
Jefferson and Madison's Virginia efforts also illuminate the meaning
of the Establishment Clause.23
Note, however, this cannot be the whole story. Many Americans,
including many in Virginia in the 1780s, favored government support
of religion. Almost half the states at the time still had established
churches.24 Even if Justice Black is correct on the state level, he does
not offer any historical evidence of his assertion that the Virginia
statute and the First Amendment had like aims, such as statements to
that effect by Jefferson or Madison. But let us put objections of this
sort to one side in order to follow Justice Black's argument further.
My concern here is more with the content of the Everson narrative,
rather than with its historical accuracy.
After his historical narrative, Justice Black famously announces
his definitional conclusion:
[T]he 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force
21. Id. at 11 ("These practices became so commonplace as to shock the
freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence. The imposition of taxes to
pay ministers salaries and to build and maintain churches and church property
aroused their indignation.").
22. Id. at 11-12 ("The movement toward this end reached its dramatic climax
in Virginia in 1785-86 when the Virginia legislative body was about to renew
Virginia's tax levy for the support of the established church. Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison led the fight against this tax. Madison wrote his great Memorial and
Remonstrance against the law." (citations omitted)).
23. Id. at 13 ("This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the
First Amendment in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson
played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the
same protection against government intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia
statute." (citations omitted)).
24. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 27-78 (providing a historical survey of post-
Revolutionary War state religious establishments in the United States explaining
these facts and others).
972010]
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nor influence a person to go or to remain away from church against
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups or
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against the
establishment of religion was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between Church and State.' 25
It is unclear how all these conclusions flow from the foregoing
historical narrative that Justice Black presents, except perhaps as a
summary of what Jefferson and Madison sought to make the rule in
Virginia in the 1780s. In any event, one might understandably
anticipate that the Board of Education's modest school bus fare
reimbursement program stood no chance of being upheld after this
lead up-but one would be wrong in this conclusion!
Shortly after the long list of "thou shalt nots" quoted above,
Justice Black says, "But we must not strike that state statute down if it
is within the state's constitutional power even though it approaches
the verge of that power." 26 Citizens have a right to freely exercise
their religion, and, according to Justice Black, they cannot be
excluded from public benefits because of that free exercise. 27 He later
adds that the First Amendment requires religious neutrality from
government. 28
Several puzzling conclusions follow from the juxtaposition of this
25. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 16.
27. Id. ("On the other hand, other language of the amendment commands that
New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.
Consequently, it cannot exclude . .. the members of any ... faith, because of their
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."
(emphasis added)).
28. Id. at 18 ("That Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions
than it is to favor them.").
98 [Vol. 47
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neutrality language with the equally categorical separationist language
that precedes it. Justice Black gives no historical support for the
neutrality language. In fact, no authority of any kind is proffered to
back up these statements of law. This stands in quite marked contrast
to the historical narrative that Justice Black gives to underpin his list
of "thou shalt nots." A yet bigger problem is that these two positions
point to contrary results in the case. All the more the surprise to the
dissenters when Justice Black uses this relatively brief and ahistorical
public welfare/neutrality argument to hold the bus fare reimbursement
program constitutional in contradiction to the longer historical
separationist argument that precedes it.29
In dissent, not surprisingly, Justice Jackson finds the opinion of
the Court to lead in one direction before, at the last minute, reaching
the opposite conclusion. 30 According to Justice Jackson, "The New
Jersey Act in question makes the character of the school, not the needs
of the children determine the eligibility of parents to
reimbursement." 31 Echoing Justice Black's words and turning them
against him, Justice Jackson asserts:
The state cannot maintain a Church and it can no more tax its
citizens to furnish free carriage to those who attend a Church [sic]
The prohibition against the establishment of religion cannot be
circumvented by a subsidy, bonus or reimbursement of expense to
individuals for receiving religious instruction and indoctrination. 32
He then concludes that, "It seems to me that the basic fallacy in the
Court's reasoning, which accounts for its failure to apply the
principles it avows, is in ignoring the essentially religious test by
which the beneficiaries of this expenditure are selected."33
Justice Jackson also joins in Justice Rutledge's dissent (as do
Justices Frankfurter and Burton). Unlike Justice Jackson's solo
29. Id.
30. Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("In fact, the undertones of the opinion,
advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem
utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their commingling in
educational matters.").
31. Id. at 20.
32. Id. at 24.
33. Id. at 25.
2010] 99
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dissent, this opinion is deeply based on an interpretation of Jefferson
and Madison's views on religious establishment, especially as
expressed in the religious liberty struggles in Virginia in the 1780s. 34
In this it is like the first, main portion of Justice Black's majority
opinion, but its conclusion is, of course, quite different. Let us inquire
as to why this is so, since both opinions have the same historical
focus.
Justice Rutledge's analytic aim in his Everson dissent is to define
an establishment of religion in order to determine the scope of the
clause's prohibition.35 He asserts, "Not simply an established church,
but any law respecting an establishment of religion is forbidden." 36 He
extends this broad interpretation to the meaning of the word "religion"
itself in the clause. 37  The combination of Justice Rutledge's
description of what constitutes an establishment of religion with his
expansive definition of religion gives his understanding of the
meaning of the Establishment Clause an exceedingly wide prohibitory
scope.
He further emphasizes the importance of this issue and ties it to
the constitutional founding, saying, "For Madison, as also for
Jefferson, religious freedom was the crux of the struggle for freedom
in general."3 For Justice Rutledge, the political conflict over the
Assessment Bill in Virginia in 1784-85 was the most important and
34. Id. at 33-34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("No provision of the Constitution is
more closely tied to or given content by its generating history than the religious
clause of the First Amendment. It is at once the refined product and the terse
summary of that history. The history includes not only Madison's authorship and the
proceedings before the First Congress, but also the long and intensive struggle for
religious freedom in America, more especially in Virginia, of which the Amendment
was the direct culmination." (citation omitted)).
35. Id. at 29 ("This case forces us squarely to determine for the first time what
was 'an establishment of religion' in the First Amendment's conception.").
36. Id. at 31. Justice Rutledge continues, "But the object was broader than
separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and
permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by
comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." Id. at
31-32.
37. Id. at 33 ("The word connotes the broadest content, determined not by the
form or formality of the teaching or where it occurs, but by its essential nature
regardless of those details.").
38. Id. at 34.
100 [Vol. 47
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meaningful event in the battle for religious freedom.39 Justice
Rutledge maintains Madison played a pivotal role in the debate over
the bill and that Madison's views on that subject, and on the
establishment of religion generally, are most clearly and
comprehensively stated in Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments. He says, "The Remonstrance is at
once the most concise and the most accurate statement of the views of
the First Amendment's author concerning what is 'an establishment of
religion. "'40
In the Remonstrance, Justice Rutledge sees Madison as taking a
categorical stance against governmental aid to, or relation with,
religion.4 1 This was especially true with regard to taxation for
religious support. Justice Rutledge says, "In no phase was he more
unrelentingly absolute than in opposing state support or aid by
taxation." 42 From this, Justice Rutledge announces, "In view of this
history, no further proof is needed that the Amendment forbids any
appropriation, large or small, from public funds to aid or support any
and all religious exercises."43 Even the lack of confirmation in the
adoption history of the First Amendment does not move Justice
Rutledge from this conclusion.4 4
From this historical exploration, Justice Rutledge concludes,
"New Jersey's action therefore exactly fits the type of exaction and
the kind of evil at which Madison and Jefferson struck."4 5 Justice
Rutledge does not, however, refute Justice Black's public welfare
argument to avoid Justice Black's decision upholding the
39. Id. at 36 ("The climax came in the legislative struggle of 1784-1785 over
the Assessment Bill.").
40. Id. at 37.
41. See id. at 39-40 ("As the Remonstrance discloses throughout, Madison
opposed every form and degree of official relation between religion and civil
authority."). Justice Rutledge states this again when he says, "With Jefferson,
Madison believed that to tolerate any fragment of establishment would be by so
much to perpetuate restraint upon that freedom." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 41.
44. Id. at 42 ("By contrast with the Virginia history, congressional debates on
consideration of the Amendment reveal only sparse discussion, reflecting the fact
that the essential issues had been settled." (citation omitted)).
45. Id. at 46.
2010] 101
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constitutionality of the New Jersey bus transportation reimbursement
program. Justice Rutledge's rhetorical strategy in answering Justice
Black is to cast the majority opinion as a stark either/or choice: either
we prohibit all relation with, and aid to, religion by government, or
else we cannot prevent their complete commingling and a full place
for religion in public welfare expenditures. Justice Rutledge is
confident that neither the Clause's history, nor the popular will can
support the second option.
He turns to potential line drawers who would permit some, but not
all, aids to religion based upon whether or not they are direct or
indirect, large or small, essential or not important, and so on. We
cannot, Justice Rutledge suggests, meaningfully distinguish among
different aids to parochial school education. 4 6 In his mind, a dollar
given for one form of aid to religion is functionally, and therefore,
constitutionally indistinguishable from a dollar given for any other
form of aid to religion. The two are fungible.
With this foundation, Justice Rutledge next asserts that, since no
constitutional distinction can be made between different forms of aid
to religion, acceptance of Justice Black's public welfare argument is
tantamount to the constitutional permissibility of any and all
governmental aid to religion.47 Putting the issue and the alternatives in
the starkest terms, Justice Rutledge asserts:
We have here then one substantial issue, not two. To say that New
Jersey's appropriation and her use of the power of taxation for
raising the funds appropriated are not for public purposes but are
for private ends, is to say that they are for the support of religion
46. Id. at 48 ("Payment of transportation is no more, nor is it any the less
essential to education, whether religious or secular, than payment for tuitions, for
teachers' salaries, for buildings, equipment and necessary materials. Nor is it any the
less directly related, in a school giving religious instruction, to the primary religious
objective all those essential items of cost are intended to achieve. No rational line
can be drawn between payment for such larger, but not more necessary, items and
payment for transportation.").
47. Id. at 49-50 ("If the fact alone be determinative that religious schools are
engaged in education, thus promoting the general and individual welfare, together
with the legislature's decision that the payment of public moneys for their aid makes
their work a public function, then I can see no possible basis, except one of dubious
legislative policy, for the state's refusal to make full appropriation for support of
private, religious schools, just as is done for public instruction.").
102 [Vol. 47
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and religious teaching. Conversely, to say that they are for public
purposes is to say that they are not for religious ones.48
Justice Rutledge will not let Justice Black or anyone else have it
both ways because, for him, a religious purpose is a private purpose
and a public purpose is necessarily secular. When the question is
posed in this way, he is confident that his answer will follow. He is
also confident that his answer to this question is Madison's answer.
He says:
In truth this view contradicts the whole purpose and effect of the
First Amendment as heretofore conceived. The 'public function'-
'public welfare'-'social legislation' argument seeks in Madison's
words, to 'employ Religion (that is, here, religious education) as an
engine of Civil policy.' Remonstrance, Par. 5. It is of one piece
with the Assessment Bill's preamble, although with the vital
difference that it wholly ignores what that preamble explicitly
states.49
In this way Justice Rutledge identifies New Jersey's bus
transportation reimbursement program with the Assessment Bill's
provision for the payment of Christian teachers and ministers in the
1780s. The upshot of this argument is that government may not aid
religion in any way.50
Although not "unsympathetic toward the burden which our
constitutional separation puts on parents who desire religious
48. Id. at 51.
49. Id. This passage cites the Assessment Bill preamble, which reads in part:
Whereas the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natural
tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and preserve
the peace of society; which cannot be effected without a competent
provision for learned teachers ... it is judged that such provision may be
made by the Legislature, without counteracting the liberal principle
heretofore adopted and intended to be preserved by abolishing all
distinctions of pre-eminence amongst the different societies of
communities of Christians.
Id. at 51 n.43 (quoting WILLIAM HENRY FOOTE, SKETCHES OF VIRGINIA 340 (1850)).
50. Id. at 52-53 ("Legislatures are free to make, and courts to sustain,
appropriations only when it can be found that in fact they do not aid, promote,
encourage or sustain religious teaching or observances . ... .).
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instruction mixed with secular for their children,"' Justice Rutledge
insists "we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith
that complete separation between the state and religion is best for the
state and best for religion." 52 Rather than being unfair, Justice
Rutledge insists, "it is only by observing the prohibition rigidly that
the state can maintain its neutrality and avoid partisanship." 53 For
Justice Rutledge, this command is not merely one of prudence or good
sense, but one of constitutional principle.54
EQUAL FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Let us turn now from a close reading of what Everson says to a
critique of the opinions and doctrine in the case, starting with a
weighing of the arguments presented. Considering just what Justices
Black, Jackson and Rutledge have to say in their Everson opinions,
the two dissenters seem at first to have much the better of the
argument on the facts, history, and doctrine. Justice Jackson is correct
that much of Justice Black's opinion-certainly its discussion of the
framing history of the Establishment Clause-leads the reader to
become convinced of the strength of the separationist arguments made
by all three Justices and to anticipate the Court ruling against the
constitutionality of the bus fare reimbursement program in the case.
Both Justices Black and Rutledge make detailed arguments that
Madison accepted a broad, categorical view of separation of church
and state-one that brooked no exceptions or accommodations of
religion and one that they (and we) should accept too. This historical
separationist argument makes Justice Black's opinion, and in
particular his public welfare/neutrality argument, appear both
unsupported by the framing history and insufficient to justify the
conclusion it is employed to support.
These appearances change markedly, however, if we also consider
what the Justices do not say about Madison's views, especially those
in the Remonstrance concerning religious freedom and equal rights of
51. Id. at 58.
52. Id. at 59 (citing Madison, supra note 1, 8,12).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 63 ("The matter is not one of quantity, to be measured by the amount
of money expended. Now as in Madison's day it is one of principle, to keep separate
the separate spheres as the First Amendment drew them . . . .").
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citizens. Recall Justice Rutledge's statement that, "For Madison, as
also for Jefferson, religious freedom was the crux of the struggle for
freedom in general.",5 Here, Justice Rutledge is talking about the
founders' political and historical struggle, and not about the
underlying philosophical debate about the natural rights of citizens.
One would not know from the quotations from the Remonstrance in
these opinions that, in the Remonstrance, Madison rises above the
political rhetorical level to give a philosophical justification for his
immediate political arguments. Nor would one know that this
justification was based on equal rights and freedom of conscience.56
Madison emphasizes freedom of conscience and equality of rights
throughout the Remonstrance. In the very first paragraph, he
proclaims, "The religion then of every man must be left to the
conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every
man to exercise it as these may dictate."57 He is also emphatic that this
individual right of conscience is an equal right of all.58 He complains
of the Assessment Bill, "It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens
all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the
legislative authority." 59 Madison sums his argument up in the last
paragraph of the Remonstrance in this way:
Because, finally, "the equal right of every citizen to the free
exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience" is
held by the same tenure with all our other rights. If we recur to its
origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if we weigh its importance, it
cannot be less dear to us; if we consult the "Declaration of those
rights which pertain to the good people of Virginia, as the basis and
foundation of Government," it is enumerated with equal solemnity,
or rather studied emphasis.60
From this we can see the basis for Madison's view on religious
liberty. He grounded his opposition to the Assessment Bill not in his
55. Id. at 34.
56. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 1, J[ 1.
57. Id.
58. Id. 3. In the fourth paragraph of the Remonstrance Madison says, "[T]he
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personal preferences or political strategies, but on a natural rights
philosophy, which he shared with his fellow Virginians61 and fellow
Founders. This philosophy underpins and illuminates not just his
views on religious liberty and the Establishment Clause, but the
Constitution generally. This approach also has the virtue of showing
the unity of constitutional rights and structures through basic shared
values and underlying purposes.
This is not a claim that can be accurately made about the
separationist views of Justices Black, Rutledge, and Jackson in
Everson or of modem Establishment Clause doctrine generally. This is
not an issue that is simply of historical importance, however. It has a
very important impact on the doctrinal dispute among Establishment
Clause scholars. Recall that Justices Black and Rutledge both claim
that Madison's role in the Virginia religious liberty disputes of the
1780s and, above all, Madison's Remonstrance support, yea compel,
strict separation between church in the modem day.6 2 Recall further
that Black offers no historical support for his public welfare argument
in favor of the New Jersey bus fare reimbursement program.
If we look at both the religious liberty struggle in Virginia in the
1780s and the bus fare program in New Jersey in the 1940s in light of
Madison's equal liberty arguments in the Remonstrance, important
contrasts and differences emerge. Madison's objections to the
Assessment Bill flow from the violations of equal rights and freedom
of conscience it will cause. The Bill does not present a truly equal
benefit to all,63 so Madison and the others in this debate are simply not
confronted with the question of a truly neutral, generally available
public benefit. 64 So, "the equal right of every citizen to the free
exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience" is
61. Madison's quote from the Virginia Declaration of Rights indicates
Virginians agreed with Madison's views on natural rights.
62. See supra notes 18-24, 37-43 and accompanying text, respectively, for the
arguments of Black and Rutledge on the "unrelentingly absolute" views of Madison
on the issue.
63. Some Christian groups and all non-Christian and non-religious groups
were excluded. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 72 (1947).
64. It is fair here to note that the Court is not actually confronted with such a
benefit in Everson-transportation to for-profit private schools is not included in the
bus fare reimbursement plan. See supra note 16. The Court, however, treats the
program as if it were a neutral, generally available benefit.
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violated by this unequal scheme. It is the right of equality which is
absolute and not separationism.
Circumstances are different in Everson, at least as the Court sees
the relevant facts. A neutral, generally available public welfare
benefit, such as the bus fare reimbursement program enforces, rather
than violates, equality of rights and citizenship. No class or group of
citizens is subordinated to any other. 65 On the other hand, enforcement
of the no-aid separationist "principle" 66 would mandate discrimination
against religion and violation of freedom of conscience; it would not
guarantee equality. 67 Thus, Justice Black correctly links his public
welfare theory to the Free Exercise Clause.6 8 However, Justice Black
fails to link this argument up with the clause's framing history.
Two criticisms of Rutledge's account of separation flow from the
arguments presented here. First, Justice Rutledge's account confuses a
principle (equality of rights and citizenship) with an application of that
principle in a particular historical setting (separation in the Virginia
religious liberty debate in the 1780s). In this way, it reduces
establishment doctrine to a mechanical rule that sometimes subverts
rather than protects the equality it was created to serve. Second,
Rutledge's account creates a needless conflict with the Free Exercise
Clause. For if, as Justice Black argues, the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits the government from excluding citizens from general public
welfare benefits because of their religion, while the Establishment
Clause, as Justice Rutledge argues, requires such an exclusion, "the
Establishment Clause is said to require what the Free Exercise Clause
forbids." 69 Both of these shortcomings are avoided if we start from the
basic philosophical premises of Madison's Remonstrance, i.e., equal
religious liberty and freedom of conscience, rather than from the
application of this principle in the context of Virginia in the 1780s.
65. The anti-subordination principle is an important feature of contemporary
equal protection doctrine and theory. For a leading work in the area, see Owen M.
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
66. Recall that Justice Rutledge calls this a matter of principle. See supra notes
51-54 and accompanying text.
67. This is the "burden" Justice Rutledge admits that the application of
separationist doctrine imposes upon religious scruple. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
69. McConnell, supra note 9, at 118.
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In truth, the decision to start from the basic philosophical
premises of Madison's Remonstrance is not easy, otherwise it would
have been arrived at sooner and with less conflict. We do not know
with complete assurance what Madison or the other founders would
have done in Everson and other modem cases, simply because the
founders never confronted cases like the contemporary cases. This is
primarily due to the great changes in the country in the intervening
time. Perhaps most significant among these changes is the rise of the
modem administrative welfare state.
The modem administrative welfare state complicates the
application of the principles of the Remonstrance to contemporary
cases in at least two ways. First, it requires a more nuanced
determination of what bears upon, in either a positive or a negative
manner, equality of religious liberty. Separation of church and state is
not the default setting. Instead, the determination must be made
contextually. Perhaps more significantly, not only did Madison not
anticipate the administrative welfare state, but it contradicts his basic
understanding of the nature and scope of the American republic.
Remember, Madison is the man who wrote in The Federalist that
"[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, are few and defined." 70 He neither contemplated nor
approved of the broad powers possessed by the modem administrative
state. Madison is the President who vetoed the Internal Improvements
Bill,71 which would have funded roads and other public works, and he
likely would not have accepted the constitutionality of independent
agencies and broad federal regulatory powers.
If Madison would have disagreed with the emergence of the
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
71. In his veto message, President Madison stated:
The legislative powers vested in Congress are specified and enumerated in
the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, and it does not
appear that the power proposed to be exercised by the bill is among the
enumerated powers, or that it falls by any just interpretation with the
power to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution
those or other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the
United States.
James Madison, Veto Message, (Mar. 3, 1817), in A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGE
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584-85 (James D. Richardson ed., Washington
D.C., Government Printing Office 1896).
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administrative welfare state, how does this change in governance
affect our understanding of the applicability of the Remonstrance to
contemporary Establishment Clause cases? At the very least, it cannot
leave them unchanged, lest it, like separationism, use Madison as the
justification for the violation of the very principles of equal rights of
free exercise and conscience that he wrote to protect. It will
undoubtedly add some uncertainty to the mix. It will make any
conclusion we come to second best, unless we roll back government to
the limited scope Madison originally intended where equal religious
rights and separation of church and state could coexist (a move no one
writing about the Establishment Clause today in fact suggests).
Nevertheless, given the choice between struggling to apply the
principle of equality in circumstances where Madison's original
assumptions do not hold and mechanically enforcing separation
regardless of the effect on equality of rights and conscience, the
principle of equality of rights should prevail.
CONCLUSION
Much disagreement and dispute have occurred since the Supreme
Court inaugurated the modern era of Establishment Clause doctrine in
1947 in Everson v. Board of Education. Yet, rather than turn
elsewhere, this short Article argues that the best path to clarification of
this doctrine lies in a return to basics, a return to what Everson put
forward as the basis of the meaning of the Establishment Clause-
Madison's role in the religious liberty struggle in Virginia in the
1780s and, above all, his Memorial and Remonstrance. But this
examination focuses on that which the Justices in Everson did not-
the principle of equal religious liberty that underpins Memorial and
Remonstrance and Madison's view of church/state relations generally.
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